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“A spectacular irritant”: US–Iranian relations during 
the 1960s and the World’s Best Dressed Man
Ben Offiler
ABSTRACT
In 1963, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
received evidence alleging that US aid funds to Iran had been misappropriated and 
used to bribe prominent American and Iranian figures. Members of the Iranian royal 
family and high-profile American businessmen and diplomats were implicated in the 
emerging corruption scandal. The allegations were made by the Iranian businessman 
and self-proclaimed “World’s Best Dressed Man,” Khaibar Khan Gudarzian. While the 
US Senate would ultimately reject Gudarzian’s claims, the scandal amplified tensions 
between the United States and Iran. American efforts to strengthen ties with the Shah 
of Iran during the mid-1960s, who was becoming increasingly economically and 
politically independent, were hampered by the ongoing Gudarzian case. This case 
study demonstrates the delicate nature of US–Iranian relations and highlights how far 
the balance of power between the two countries had evolved since the beginning of 
the decade.
KEYWORDS United States; Iran; diplomatic history; Cold War
On 19 March 1960, the fire department was called to a blaze at an apartment 
on Alaska Avenue NW in Washington, DC. The fire started after a party to 
celebrate the birthday of the apartment’s owner, Khaibar Khan Gudarzian, 
an Iranian citizen and businessman. The Washington Post reported that the 
party, which was attended by “about a dozen people,” was also thrown to 
celebrate the birthdays of Gudarzian’s son, Bakhtiar, and his private secre-
tary, Mariam Kushan. According to the insurance claim filed by Kushan, the 
fire caused $80,000 worth of damage to Gudarzian’s extensive clothing 
collection. The incident must have been devastating for Gudarzian, who 
styled himself as the “World’s Best Dressed Man.”1
The following year, tragedy would strike again. On 3 November 1961, 
another fire started at Gudarzian’s new residence at 923 Fifth Avenue, in 
New York. This time, the fire began following a party attended by 75 people. 
Despite losing so much the previous year, it seemed Gudarzian had been able 
to put himself back on his feet, as the insurance claim for this second fire 
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1“Blaze Destroys Fine Wardrobe, Damages Home,” Washington Post, 20 March 1960.
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cited the loss of 392 men’s suits. The World’s Best Dressed Man (or, WBDM, 
as Gudarzian often abbreviated it) was awarded $104,316 after a month-long 
trial against the Continental and Aetna insurance companies. These compa-
nies argued that Gudarzian “gave false testimony to his knowledge” of the 
“incendiary nature” of the fire, suspecting that he was in fact responsible for 
the incident.2 Gudarzian was, according to his critics then, little more than 
a con-artist; considering the nature of these two events, this was perhaps 
unsurprising.
The World’s Best Dressed Man, however, had his sights set on a target rather 
grander than disgruntled insurance agencies, namely, the royal family of the 
Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. During the mid-1960s, at a time when 
Washington sought to strengthen its ties to the Pahlavi regime in Tehran, 
Gudarzian alleged that millions of dollars of American aid had been used to 
bribe prominent Iranian and American citizens. He also sued two of the Shah’s 
siblings for more than $2 million in payments owed for a development project he 
claimed to have overseen. His flamboyant character and close ties to prominent 
Iranian elites made Gudarzian’s fantastic claims appear both tantalizing and 
plausible to some in the American media.3 One US official’s description of 
Gudarzian as “a spectacular irritant” reflected the impact that the allegations 
had in contributing to tensions between Washington and Tehran.4 While it is 
not the contention of this article that Gudarzian alone created friction between 
these two Cold War allies, his case does illustrate the delicate nature of the US– 
Iranian relationship through much of the 1960s, a state of affairs that persisted 
despite attempts by Washington to strengthen ties.
Between 1963 and 1965, a period in which US–Iranian relations were 
already in transition, Gudarzian’s allegations of corruption against the 
Pahlavi royal family infuriated the Shah and created headaches for US 
policymakers. Throughout the decade, the Johnson administration sought 
to maintain a close relationship with the Shah; oil-rich Iran was considered 
a potential but vulnerable bulwark against Soviet and communist 
encroachment in the Middle East. After a brief moment during the 
Kennedy administration, which saw the United States emphasize the role 
of development in its approach to Iran, the Johnson years saw the con-
solidation of a strategy that prioritized the use of arms sales as a means to 
strengthen relations with Tehran. The Shah’s desire for a robust and 
2“Iranian Awarded $104,306 for Fire,” New York Times, 2 February 1965.
3Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 261–62.
4Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 15 August 1967. Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran, ed. Nina D. Howland (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1999), Document 71, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d222 
(accessed 12 February 2020). [Hereafter referred to as FRUS XXII].
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technologically advanced Iranian military, alongside the fact that Iran’s 
increasing oil wealth meant that the country no longer relied on American 
largesse, led to negotiations over the extension of military credit and 
subsequently direct arms sales becoming integral to US policy toward 
Iran. The Shah, fueled by an increasing sense of independence and grandi-
osity, resented any efforts by American officials to direct his own economic, 
political, or military policies.5
Within this context, Gudarzian’s allegations of corruption were a very real 
thorn in the side of US–Iranian relations, which Stephen McGlinchey has 
argued reached a “nadir” in the mid-1960s.6 Similarly, Claudia Castiglioni 
has noted that the Johnson years marked a significant turning point as the 
Shah’s security at home and increasing assertiveness abroad coincided with 
a decline in American influence over Tehran.7 David Collier, meanwhile, has 
suggested that the United States’ leverage over Iranian affairs declined after 
the Kennedy administration as the Shah sought to reject the client–patron 
relationship that had evolved in the years following the Second World War.8 
That the Johnson administration seemed unable or unwilling to expedite 
a speedy resolution to the Gudarzian situation therefore only further aggra-
vated the Shah, exacerbating tensions between Washington and Tehran. And 
as Matthew Shannon and others have shown, non-state actors during this 
period played an important role in shaping Iranian interactions with both the 
United States and the wider world.9 In the case of Gudarzian, this flamboyant 
non-state actor inadvertently highlighted the fragility of the US–Iranian 
relationship. Gudarzian’s allegations of fraud and corruption within the 
Pahlavi royal family exposed the Shah’s insecurity regarding American sup-
port for his regime. While American policymakers considered Gudarzian 
a minor issue within the broader context of US interests in Iran and the 
5On US-Iranian relations during the 1960s see Ben Offiler, US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran: 
Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); James Bill, The Eagle 
and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); 
and Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1981).
6Stephen McGlinchey, US Arms Policies Toward the Shah’s Iran (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 42–48.
7Claudia Castiglioni, “No Longer a Client, not yet a Partner: The US–Iranian Alliance in the Johnson Years,” 
Cold War History 15, no. 4 (2015), 491–509.
8David R. Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941–1979 (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2017), 229–59. On the development of the client-patron relationship, see 
Mark Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991).
9Matthew Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education 
During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017). For other examples of how non- 
state Iranian actors have connected with international issues, see the collection edited by Roham 
Alvandi, The Age of Aryamehr: Late Pahlavi Iran and its Global Entanglements (London: Gingko 
Library, 2018).
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Middle East, for the Shah the entire affair was much more serious, an 
indication of Washington’s lack of respect for Tehran.
The World’s Best Dressed Man
For a brief period in the 1960s, Khaibar Khan Gudarzian made something of 
a name for himself in American national newspapers. A flamboyant figure, 
reporters tended to fixate on his clothing and style. In August 1960, Gudarzian 
took part in the 59th Middle Atlantic amateur golf championship. “Probably the 
most colorful of all contestants in the Eastern Open,” reported the Washington 
Post, “is Khaber [sic] Khan Goodarzian [sic] of Iran . . . The Khaibar showed up 
for the first round dressed in orange slacks and shoes and wearing a black shirt 
with bag and head covers to match . . . next day the Kaibar [sic] made his 
appearance at the first tee decked out in red slacks and a white shirt . . . his 
golf bag this time was red and his wood clubs wore fuzzy white covers.” Other 
competitors joked that they needed to go home to get more clothes.10
In September, an article in the New York Times marveled at Gudarzian’s 
“440 pairs of shoes, 55 evening jackets, 818 handkerchiefs, 180 sweaters, 714 
neckties, 127 summer suits, 77 autumn suits, 154 pair [sic] of gloves, 12 
watches and 165 watchbands.”11 Gudarzian explained to reporters that his 
wealth was a result of being “fortunate to be born in the middle of an area 
where oil comes from.”12 For a two-day visit to Paris, he apparently took just 
55 evening jackets and 204 suits. According to Gudarzian’s private secretary, 
“He puts on a fresh carnation every time he changes his clothes,” which was 
“at least six times a day.”13 It is perhaps little wonder that he relished the title 
of “World’s Best Dressed Man,” although this was not his only achievement. 
An advertisement placed in the Washington Post in February 1960 noted that 
he “was awarded the title of King of Sports in 1950” and “became Champion 
of Longest Drive, 345 Yard Hole in One in 1954.”14
According to another advertisement, Gudarzian had spent “two years of 
intensive studies and direct contact with United States and European spe-
cialists” to develop a project to construct a vast sports complex in Tehran. 
This “Olympic Sport Center,” which apparently had the “enthusiastic” sup-
port of the Shah himself, was to be “the most modern in the world . . . with 
two 18-hole grass golf courses and a stadium with a 10,000 capacity, indoor- 
10“Pitches . . . And Putts,” Washington Post, 6 August 1961.
11“Khan Visits Paris With His Luggage,” New York Times, 17 September 1961.
12“Events and Insights: Voices,” Life Magazine, 29 September 1961.
13“Khan Visits Paris With His Luggage,” New York Times, 17 September 1961.
14“Display Ad 5 – No Title: How the W.B.D.M. Became a Businessman??” Washington Post, 14 
February 1960.
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roofed.”15 Publicity material for one fundraising effort painted a picture of 
a man who could have stepped straight from the pages of a dime store 
adventure novel: “The Khaibar Khan’s life has been linked with danger, 
intrigue, romance and a world of elegance. In fact, he bears titles of Prince 
d’Elegance and the World’s Best Dressed Man.”16
On other occasions, Gudarzian also claimed to be the leader (hence, 
Khan) of the nomadic Bakhtiari tribe in Iran. He told reporters that “imme-
diately following his father’s execution the boy-khan was taken by his tribes-
men into hiding in the mountains of Bakhtiari province.”17 This account was 
later dismissed by the Iranian embassy in Washington, which claimed that 
“He started as a boyservant in the house of an Englishman working for the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in Abidan . . . When the Englishman left Abidan, he 
took Khaibar with him.”18 The embassy’s rejection of Gudarzian’s claims is 
unsurprising considering that he had recently brought a lawsuit and allega-
tions of corruption against members of the Shah’s close family. What is 
perhaps more remarkable is that this Prince d’Elegance would cause head-
aches for American policymakers charged with strengthening Washington’s 
ties with the Shah. Central to Gudarzian’s claims was the allegation that 
members of the Pahlavi royal family had, with the complicity of various 
American officials, misappropriated US aid to Iran.
The McClellan Senate inquiry
In May 1963, Gudarzian alleged that more than $100 million of US aid funds 
to Iran had been diverted to a Swiss bank account in the name of the Pahlavi 
Foundation, the charitable arm of the Shah’s family. These funds, according 
to Gudarzian, were then channeled to prominent American and Iranian 
figures. Reflecting the seriousness with which Gudarzian’s allegations were 
treated, he was allowed to testify under oath to three executive sessions of the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which was headed by 
Senator John L. McClellan (D-Arkansas).
Laurence Stern, writing in the Washington Post, captured the dichoto-
mous nature of the case. Posing the question of whether Gudarzian was an 
“Impostor or a Lone Persian Ranger,” Stern commented that
If the story proves out, as one McClellan Committee aide put it in an interview, 
it would make ‘one of the biggest scandals in the country’s history.’ If it 
15“Display Ad 8 – No Title: Sports Bulletin for Middle East (Iran),” Washington Post, 28 February 1960.
16“In the Best of Health: Tuesday Night,” The Guardian, 19 September 1962.
17Julius Dusha, “Stylish Khaibar Offers Drinks Without Proof,” Washington Post, 7 June 1963.
18Ward Just, “Iran Shah’s Accuser Faces Action by U.S.,” Washington Post, 3 October 1965.
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misfires, then the case will go down as one of the brassiest hoaxes to stir the 
investigative passion of a committee with a reputation for hard-nosed sophis-
tication about such matters.19
For American policymakers, Gudarzian’s claims were not simply a hoax 
made by a flamboyant con-artist that could be ignored or brushed under 
the carpet. Despite the flimsy evidence produced to back up the allegations, 
Gudarzian created a thorny problem for the Johnson administration. The 
Shah of Iran, known to take personal slights seriously, was incensed that the 
United States did nothing to silence or prosecute this false tribal chief. In fact, 
members of the Johnson administration were concerned that the Gudarzian 
case risked amplifying tension between Washington and Tehran because of 
the Shah’s reaction.
It was, however, nearly two years before the subcommittee released its 
findings to Congress. As evidence, McClellan explained, Gudarzian had 
provided “photocopies of 137 purported checks – face side only – ranging 
in amount from $100,000 to $2 million, in the total amount of $102 million 
for that year [1962]. They are purportedly drawn on the Swiss bank account 
of the Pahlavi Foundation of Iran – a country development program of the 
Shah of Iran – and payable to numerous prominent Americans, Iranians, and 
others.” However, McClellan declared that “Notwithstanding the fantastic 
nature of these allegations,” efforts to substantiate them “proved fruitless” for 
three key reasons. Perhaps most damning was the written testimony pro-
vided by Dr. A. Schaefer and Dr. A. Hartman from the Union Bank of 
Switzerland, from which the checks produced by Gudarzian as evidence 
were supposedly drawn. In a letter to McClellan, they concisely explained 
why the checks were false:
The type face appearing on the documents which you submitted to us for 
inspection does not correspond to that used in the preparation of such state-
ments for our customers. Actually, they are printed on a book-keeping 
machine and they are not, as in the case of the Photostats in question, written 
by ordinary typewriter. In addition, neither our head office, our Geneva 
branch, nor any other branch of this bank has at this time, nor at any time 
in the past, ever had an account in the name of the Pahlavi Foundation of Iran. 
Further, the account number listed on the sheets does not conform in any 
measure to the numerical system employed by us. For these very convincing 
reasons we are certain that the evidence which you have forwarded to us for 
examination is forged.20
19Laurence Stern, “Khaibar Khan’s Intriguing Tale Stirs Up a Humdrum Capital,” Washington Post, 29 
May 1963.
20Proceedings of Congress and General Congressional Publications, Congressional Record (Bound 
Edition), 89th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 111.5, 6 April 1965, 7015, https://www.govinfo.gov/con 
tent/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1965-pt5/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1965-pt5-8-2.pdf (accessed 12 February 2020).
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McClellan also reported that “an audit was made by the subcommittee staff 
of aid funds in the US banks and the same type of audit was made in Iran at 
our request by the Inspector General’s office of the Department of State. The 
audits covered approximately 67 percent of US aid funds to Iran for the 
period March 1959 to June 1963, approximately $169 million. There was no 
indication whatever of any diversion of aid funds to the Pahlavi Foundation.” 
Finally, the Senate was informed that
The subcommittee heard testimony showing that apparently on November 5, 
1962, imposters had established bank accounts in the City National Bank of 
Beverly Hills, Calif., in the names of members of the royal family of Iran. 
Accounts were set up in the name of Prince Mahmoud Reza Pahlavi and 
Princess Fatemeh Pahlavi by two persons, a man and a woman who claimed 
to be the Prince and the Princess, respectively, at a time when, to the best of our 
ability to determine – which immigration records substantiate – neither the 
Prince nor the Princess was in the United States.
Moreover, “the bank employee who received the account from the woman 
representing herself as the Princess positively identified Miss Mariam 
Kushan [Gudarzian’s private secretary] as the person who opened the 
account.” These three factors caused Senator Karl E. Mundt, (R-S. Dakota), 
to remark “It seems to me that Khaibar Khan [sic] recital is a stranger and 
more fantastic story than anything I have ever read in the whole book of 
Arabian Nights fables.” He went on to add that “What we have before us now 
is either the greatest swindle by representatives of a friendly foreign govern-
ment on the taxpayers of the United States, or it is the most audacious and 
arrogant operation ever undertaken in the history of Congress.”21
Others lined up to support McClellan’s findings and condemn Gudarzian. 
Senator Fred R. Harris, (D-Oklahoma), proclaimed that “There can be no 
question from an examination of the facts that at best the so-called Khaibar 
Khan has wholly, shockingly and reprehensibly failed to substantiate the 
charges he has made; at worst, he and his associates are guilty of the grossest 
kind of fabrication and fraud. I personally am inclined to the latter opinion.”22
Senator Henry M. Jackson, (D-Washington), went further to accuse 
Gudarzian of being “engaged in an international confidence game. We 
have reason to believe,” Jackson continued, “that he has ‘taken’ some pro-
minent Americans for large sums of money, involving hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars, as a result of his skillful and devious operations in the 





entangled when Gudarzian brought a suit against Prince Mahmoud and 
Princess Fatemeh which claimed he was owed in excess of $2 million 
promised to him by the Shah to build sports arenas in Iran through his 
World Athletics Sports Corp.24 Yet despite the vociferous rejection of 
Gudarzian by the Senate Committee tasked with investigating his allegations 
against the Pahlavi family, the case contributed to tension between 
Washington and Tehran throughout 1960s.
Impact on US–Iranian relations
In May 1963, the State Department had been caught unawares by 
Gudarzian’s allegations. Upon learning of the case, Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk sought to reassure the Iranian embassy in Washington that the execu-
tive branch only heard of the Senate committee’s investigation after 
Gudarzian submitted his “evidence.”25 Rusk’s protestations were met with 
disbelief by Iranian officials. Following a meeting in November 1964 with 
Foreign Minister Abbas Aram, Stuart Rockwell from the Tehran embassy 
reported that the “Shah and Prince [Mahmoud Reza, who Gudarzian had 
since embroiled in a lawsuit alleging the prince owed him more than $2 
million] are incensed about this matter.” Rockwell added that the “Shah and 
Aram were at loss [to] understand how a crook like Gudarzian should be able 
get away with all this, apparently so easily.” Simply put, Iranian officials 
questioned “why had [the] USG done nothing to prevent Gudarzian from 
taking further action based on same falsehoods, or at least to make sure that 
his moves were ineffective?” The Shah’s complaints, according to Aram, went 
one step further, suggesting that “some people in State Dept were not 
displeased that he [Gudarzian] was embarrassing Iranian Royal Family.”26 
Rockwell, for his part, concurred with the sentiment of Iranian complaints 
relating to Gudarzian, concluding his message by asking “Could not Dept 
take stronger action to warn Iranian troublemakers of this kind against 
abusing hospitality of US to create trouble for govt with which US maintains 
friendly relations?”27
24Anon., “Suit Charges Shah’s Kin Stole $3 Million in Funds,” New York Times, 10 December 1964; and 
Ward Just, “Iran Shah’s Accuser Faces Action by U.S.,” Washington Post, 3 October 1965.
25Secretary of State Dean Rusk to American Embassy in Tehran, 17 May 1963. John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 116A (con-
tinued from Box 116), Iran General, 5–63.
26Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 5 November 1964. FRUS XXII, Document 
57, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d57 (accessed 12 February 2020).
27Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 5 November 1964. FRUS XXII, Document 
57, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d57 (accessed 12 February 2020).
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The Shah’s mistrust stemmed in large part from his lasting resentment toward 
the Kennedy administration and a personal antipathy toward JFK himself. In 1961, 
President Kennedy had established the Iran Task Force, which called for greater 
support for the reformist government of Prime Minister Ali Amini.28 Indeed, 
according to the historian David Collier, Amini was effectively forced upon 
a reluctant Shah by the American government.29 Although there were divisions 
between more cautious traditionalist policymakers and Kennedy’s more activist 
New Frontiersmen, the Task Force advocated a development program involving 
land reform, measures to stabilize the economy, and an anticorruption campaign.30 
The New Frontiersmen, in particular, favored modernization efforts to lead Iran 
through Walt Rostow’s “five stages” of development.31 While these efforts were 
soon overshadowed by Washington’s goal of achieving security through stability in 
Iran, the Shah interpreted the Task Force’s backing of Amini as an attempt to 
undermine his own authority.32
In some accounts, the Shah was said to be “overjoyed” at the news in 
November 1963 that Kennedy had been killed, while Abbas Milani notes that only 
the intervention of then Prime Minister Asadollah Alam and Foreign Minister Aram 
prevented the Shah from sending “an angry diatribe against Kennedy addressed to 
President Lyndon Johnson” in which he lambasted Johnson’s predecessor for “unduly 
interfering in the affairs of the country.”33 Central to the Shah’s misgivings therefore 
was the perennial feeling that the United States was insufficiently appreciative of his 
friendship and could not be trusted to wholeheartedly support his regime.
But the Shah was not ameliorated by the fact that his concerns about 
Gudarzian were at least partly shared by American officials. In December, 
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, wrote to Rusk warning that the Gudarzian “affair has incensed the 
Shah more than any previous incident in US–Iranian relations during the past 
ten years.” Talbot also noted that the Shah believed that there was “insufficient 
high-level U.S.G. interest in bringing Gudarzian to book.”34 That Talbot could 
28Record of Action No. 2427, Taken at the 484th Meeting of the National Security Council, 19 May 1961. 
FRUS XXII, Document 51, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d51 (accessed 
12 February 2020).
29Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 200.
30On the bureaucratic divisions within the Kennedy administration regarding Iran, see James F. Goode, 
The United States and Iran: In the Shadow of Musaddiq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 167–81; 
Offiler, US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran, 26–48; and April R. Summitt, “For a White 
Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (2004), 560–75.
31Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 199–207.
32On Washington’s focus on stability in Iran, see Victor V. Nemchenok, “In Search of Stability Amid Chaos: 
US Policy Toward Iran, 1961–63,” Cold War History 10, no. 3 (2010), 341–369.
33Ibid., 230; and Milani, The Shah, 305.
34Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
(Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk, 19 December 1964. FRUS XXII, Document 62, https://history.state. 
gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d62 (accessed 12 February 2020).
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make such a claim when the past ten years had included an array of serious 
incidents in US–Iranian relations is more than a little astonishing. As noted 
previously, the Shah had been incensed by the Kennedy administration’s 
policies, claiming to have been forced into appointing Amini as prime minister 
in 1961. And just a few years before that, General Valiollah Qarani had been 
accused of “conspiring with an unnamed foreign power – generally understood 
to be the United States – against the Shah’s regime.” As Mark Gasiorowski has 
written, even in the years that followed the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup that 
removed the Shah’s political rival, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, 
thereby effectively restoring him to the Peacock Throne, “the Shah’s relations 
with the United States were more ambiguous than is commonly thought.”35 
For the Shah, the recent history of US–Iranian relations was not a wholly 
positive one; instead, it had for many years been marked by insecurity and 
uncertainty, which explains how an issue such as the Gudarzian case could be 
simultaneously considered relatively minor by American officials but hugely 
significant by the Shah. While the Gudarzian case therefore could perhaps have 
been dismissed as the work of a con-artist, it contributed to a pattern of 
tensions within US–Iranian relations.
For a number of reasons, as Talbot put it, “[American] foreign policy 
interests in this problem are substantial.” First, wrote Talbot, “[t]he Shah 
has just rammed through the Iranian Parliament, at our insistence and 
with considerable risk to his domestic position, a highly unpopular 
measure extending immunities and privileges to American military per-
sonnel in Iran.”36 In October 1964, the Iranian majlis had passed 
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which granted immunity to all 
official American personnel and their dependents.37 According to James 
Bill, the SOFA was “unprecedented. It was a particularly severe applica-
tion of the concept since it nullified any and all Iranian legal control 
over the growing American military colony stationed in that country.”38 
Iranians across the political spectrum opposed the new privileges that 
the SOFA granted Americans living in Iran, recalling their country’s 
long history of intervention and exploitation by foreign powers.39 For 
many years, the SOFA incident was a cause of nationalist outrage and 
35Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,” International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 25 (1993), 625.
36Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
(Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk, 19 December 1964. FRUS XXII, Document 62, https://history.state. 
gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d62 (accessed 12 February 2020).
37“Vienna Convention and Status of Forces (Background Summary),” 12 November 1964. DEF 15–1. 
NARA, RG59, NEAIRN, Records Relating to Iran 1964–1966, Box 5.
38Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 158.
39Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, “Iran’s Foreign Devils,” Foreign Policy, 38 (Spring, 1980), 19–34.
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opposition to the Shah. Notably, the prominent clerical opponent to the 
regime, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—who would later provide leader-
ship to the revolution that finally toppled the Shah—was exiled to Iraq 
for his involvement in protests against the SOFA. When the Johnson 
administration extended $200 million of credit for military purchases to 
the Shah’s regime just two weeks after the agreement was reached, many 
Iranians interpreted it as a bribe and further evidence of the Shah’s 
collusion with Washington.40
US officials noted that the repercussions of the SOFA were “a very high 
price [which] has been paid for something that isn’t of commensurate 
value.”41 Stuart Rockwell suggested that “not only [Prime Minister] 
Mansur but to some extent also the Shah’s regime has paid an unexpectedly 
high price.”42 As such, the Johnson administration had created a situation 
whereby the Shah had not only supported US goals regarding the SOFA but, 
in doing so, encountered significant internal opposition. The tension gener-
ated between Washington and Tehran by the SOFA compounded the com-
plexity of US–Iranian relations in the mid-1960s.
In addition to the SOFA controversy, the Shah had, according to Talbot, 
been “very forthcoming” regarding a case in Iran involving an American 
engineer named Robert Bredin who had been sentenced to three years in 
prison for murdering his wife despite “evidence clearly indicating death from 
other causes.” There were also ongoing questions surrounding the stalled 
negotiations between Tehran and the American-led consortium that had 
operated the country’s oil industry since the CIA-sponsored coup in 1953 
restored the Shah to power and reversed Mohammed Mossadeq’s policy of 
nationalization, in addition to Iranian support for Johnson’s war in 
Vietnam.43
In the months that followed, the Gudarzian case continued to impact the 
Johnson administration’s relationship with Iran and its wider foreign policy 
40Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 27 October 1964. FRUS XXII, 108, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d54 (accessed 12 February 2020). 
Footnote 3 cites an airgram from Tehran, 15 December 1964, as having “reported that the ‘coincidence’ 
of having the parliamentary vote on the status of forces bill followed within 2 weeks by the unanimous 
vote to accept a $200 million credit from US commercial banks for the purchase of US military 
equipment had contributed to the widespread belief that in some way the passage of the status bill 
was the price exacted by the United States for the granting of the credits in question.”
41“Martin Herz to Gordon Tiger,” 16 December 1964. DEF 15–1. NARA, RG59, NEAIRN, Records Relating to 
Iran 1964–1966, Box 5.
42Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 14 October 1964. FRUS XXII, 104, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d52 (accessed 12 February 2020).
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interests. For example, writing to the American ambassador in Tehran, Rusk 
noted that the “President places [a] very high priority” on the need for 
“maximum Free World Assistance” in Vietnam. In Iran’s case, this would 
ideally be a “self-contained service or support military unit”; nonmilitary 
units, such as medical personnel, or petroleum were less desirable alterna-
tives. However, concerned that Gudarzian, in addition to delicate negotia-
tions regarding the oil consortium, “would prejudice [a] favorable response,” 
Rusk was content to let the ambassador determine whether “a further delay 
might be appropriate.”44
As M. Gordon Tiger at the State Department’s Iran Desk observed in 
a letter to Martin F. Herz at the Tehran embassy, these “various separate but 
nevertheless subtly related matters . . . [required] proposals that will really 
start untying this peculiar series of knots.”45 Iranian assistance and support 
in these matters, Tiger implied, will be expected to result in a quid pro quo 
exchange of American assistance. In short, Phillips Talbot argued that
We must anticipate difficulties in these endeavors and in all other aspects of 
our relations so long as the Shah can feel that he has been obliging in meeting 
all of our requests whereas we do not lift a finger to keep his family from being 
harassed unjustly in our courts or his Ambassador from being falsely accused, 
all by one he considers a proven scoundrel whom we do not even expose 
through publicity channels.46
While the Shah’s perception that US officials were unwilling to “lift a finger” 
was not entirely fair, it reflected his frustration with the Johnson adminis-
tration. In response, Dean Rusk agreed with Talbot’s recommendations that 
he should meet with the Iranian foreign minister to reassure him that the 
United States was “determined to take every measure within our power to 
put a stop to this evident abuse of our state courts by bringing the evidence of 
possible violations of law forcefully to the attention of the proper authori-
ties.” Rusk also sent letters to the Secretary of the Treasury, Governor of 
New York, and Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to persuade them of 
the seriousness of the matter.47
44Secretary of State to American Embassy in Tehran, 2 March 1965. Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential 
Library, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, Country File, Box 136 (1 of 2), Iran – Cables, Vol. 1, 1–64- 
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Relating to Iran, 1964–1966, Box 5, DEF 15–3 I.
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Within weeks of Talbot’s report, Rusk met again with Foreign Minister 
Aram, this time to discuss Iran’s negotiations with the oil consortium. 
Tehran had finally agreed to the consortium’s proposal “to treat royalty 
payments as an item of operating expenses rather than as part of the 
country’s 50 percent share of profits,” which had also been accepted by 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. A sticking point remained, however, over 
a clause that Iranian officials believed granted the companies, but denied 
Iran, “the unilateral right to demand arbitration in the event of an alleged 
breach of the agreement.” In preparation for Rusk’s meeting, Turner 
C. Cameron, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, argued that “our 
present difficulties with the Shah over the Gudarzian affair would suggest 
a somewhat more forthcoming approach.” Where previously American 
officials had claimed that “our influence is not sufficient to force the 
[American oil] companies to abandon a position which they consider impor-
tant in their operations abroad,” the Johnson administration now sought to 
exert some influence over the consortium in order to relieve some of the 
pressure it was facing as a result of the ongoing Gudarzian saga.48
Despite the Johnson administration’s efforts to resolve the oil problem, in 
February 1965 Ambassador Julius Holmes was informed by Aram of the 
“Shah’s undiminishing concern and annoyance over [the] Gudarzian case.” 
Gudarzian’s lawyer in his lawsuit against Prince Mahmoud and Princess 
Fatemeh further infuriated the Shah by insisting that his client be present to 
hear the testimony of the Shah’s brother. Gudarzian’s claim that his “life 
would be in danger” if he were to return to Iran meant that the testimony 
would need to take place in neighboring Turkey, which was unacceptable to 
the Shah. Holmes added his voice to earlier warnings by Talbot and Cameron 
that “this matter will continue seriously to trouble our relations with Iran 
until it is settled.”49 For US policymakers, however, the Johnson administra-
tion had done its utmost to accommodate the Shah and resolve the 
Gudarzian case. One week after Holmes’s telegram, Benjamin H. Read, 
Executive Secretary of the State Department, outlined the steps that had 
thus far been taken by Washington:
Late in December, Secretary Rusk brought the problem directly to the 
attention of the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
Governor of New York. Background briefings were given to the press in 
early January. The Department of Justice has been cooperating, within 
48Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Cameron) to Secretary of 
State Rusk, 6 January 1965. FRUS XXII, Document 63, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ 
frus1964-68v22/d63 (accessed 12 February 2020).
49Julius C. Holmes to Secretary of State, 10 February 1965. Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Papers 
of LBJ, National Security File, Country File, Box 136 (1 of 2), Iran, Cables, Vol. 1, 1-64-12-65.
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limits imposed by our federal system and by the separation of executive 
and judicial powers on its capacity to intervene where private litigation is 
involved. . . . A Federal grand jury investigation into Gudarzian’s activities 
was launched in December to determine whether sufficient evidence could 
be obtained to try him on criminal charges for some of his questionable 
activities.50
Even so, the situation had deteriorated to the point that “On February 13, the 
Shah’s anger erupted violently in the decision to discharge his excellent 
Ambassador to Washington who has, in fact, done all any Ambassador 
could have done.” Read highlighted further efforts being made to find 
a solution, including the “Department of State . . . exploring with the 
Department of Justice whether there might be any extraordinary steps the 
Department of Justice could take at this point that would quickly extricate 
the Prince and Princess and end Gudarzian’s abuse of our judicial system.”51 
It was evident to US officials that the longer the case continued and the more 
deeply embroiled members of the royal family became, the greater the impact 
on US–Iranian relations.
In response to a press briefing held by Gordon Tiger, Gudarzian wrote 
directly to Dean Rusk to express his disappointment with the role that the 
State Department was playing, as he saw it, in supporting the Shah’s agenda 
against him. Criticizing Tiger’s remarks at the briefing, Gudarzian expressed 
his gratitude that those in attendance were “sufficiently intelligent as to sense 
the motivation as well as the untruth of much that was said.”52 He was 
particularly concerned that State Department officials had had a hand in 
advising Khosro Eghbal, a lawyer and the brother of former Prime Minister 
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, to leave the United States. In December 1964, 
Gudarzian’s legal team alleged that Khosro Eghbal had visited the United 
States in order to “to remove assets of Princess Fatemeh and was served with 
a [court] summons which he evaded by leaving the country on the advice of 
Donald Wehmeyer [Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs, Department of State].”53 Outside of the country, Eghbal 
could no longer be brought to court as a witness. In closing, Gudarzian 
added that by bringing charges of corruption against members of the Shah’s 
50Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 18 February 1965. FRUS XXII, Document 69, 
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51Ibid.
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General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Political and 
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family, he was “fighting to obtain freedom from want, freedom from fear, 
and freedom of conscience for the poor people of our tribes and the other 
common people of my country.”54 By framing his allegations in terms of 
a pursuit of freedom, Gudarzian sought to foster a sense of noble universality 
that would generate wider support.
However, the question of which Iranians would actually attend the court 
proceedings continued to be problematic. At a meeting on 15 March with 
John D. Jernegan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs, Aram once more stressed Tehran’s disappointment 
that the Prince and Princess were unable to testify in Iran. Jernegan sug-
gested that the “matter might be resolved more quickly and it be best for 
[the] Shah’s peace of mind if Prince and Princess could make [the] admit-
tedly long trip to New York and accept for that one appearance related 
unpleasantness in order to get [the] case off books as soon as possible.”55 
From the Shah’s perspective, however, such a suggestion was an affront to the 
dignity of the royal family.
Later that month, at a meeting with the Secretary of State and Attorney 
General, “Senator McClellan indicated that he recognized that Gudarzian 
was making false statements regarding the AID program” in his allegations 
that members of the Shah’s family misappropriated US funds. McClellan was 
equally keen to resolve the ongoing case and expose Gudarzian. As such, he 
informed Rusk and Katzenbach that “he was disposed to set further hearings 
on the subject of the Gudarzian allegations and to pose questions to 
Gudarzian which would result in his either committing perjury or with-
drawing the charges.”56 It was agreed that to expedite the problem, officials 
from the State and Justice Departments would work with the senator’s staff 
to review the new documentation provided by Gudarzian. The Johnson 
administration was doing its utmost to find a resolution to the situation 
that would be both favorable to the Shah and US–Iranian relations.
On 7 April, while on a visit to Washington, the Shah met with the Secretary 
of State. At the meeting, Rusk reassured the Iranian that the “only other matter 
which had recently been taking up more of his time than this affair was Viet- 
54Khaibar Khan to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 24 February 1965. National Archives, College Park, RG59, 
General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Political and 
Defense, Box, 2333, POL 15-1, 1-1-65, Iran.
55John D. Jernegan to Secretary of State, 15 March 1965. National Archives, College Park, RG59, General 
Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Political and Defense, Box 
2333, POL 15-1, Head of State, Executive Branch, 3-1-65, Iran.
56Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Wehmeyer) to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot), 25 March 1965. FRUS 
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nam [sic].” While this was an obvious attempt to persuade the Shah of the 
seriousness with which the Americans were treating the Gudarzian case, Rusk 
was also able to report with relief that “Gudarzian’s days are now numbered” 
and that he “might flee the country.” The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations had, after all, at last publicly dismissed the evidence Gudarzian 
had provided to support his allegations. In response, the “Shah expressed 
pleasure with statements in Senate” by McClellan and others but “made no 
substantive comment” when told by Rusk that it was important for Iranian 
witnesses, potentially including the Shah’s family members, to provide witness 
testimony “if Gudarzian is to be successfully tried on criminal charges.”57 The 
suggestion that Iranian royalty, the Shah’s own family, should need to spend 
a day in court in order to bring Gudarzian down was unfathomable. Without 
prosecution, however, tensions between the Johnson administration and the 
Shah would continue to simmer.
An article in The Nation on 12 April 1965, written by the investigative 
journalist Fred J. Cook, brought further attention to the case. In an eighteen- 
page exposé titled “The Billion-Dollar Mystery,” Cook recounted Gudarzian’s 
claims against the Shah’s family, detailing how Gudarzian was supposedly able 
to acquire the checks, which formed the basis of his evidence, through the use 
of an extensive espionage network in Tehran that had infiltrated the Shah’s 
own palace. The article noted some of the Americans alleged to have received 
payments from the Pahlavi Foundation, including Mrs Loy Henderson 
($1 million), Henry Luce ($500,000), Allen Dulles ($1 million), George 
V. Allen ($1 million), and David Rockefeller ($2 million).58 Cook also cited 
the evidence provided by Gudarzian’s lawyer, Richard H. Wels, that sought to 
show how US aid funds had been channeled from Iran’s Plan Organization, 
which orchestrated the country’s postwar development programs, into the 
Pahlavi Foundation.59 Cook claimed that within days of Gudarzian’s evidence 
reaching Lyndon Johnson’s advisers, “all economic aid to Iran was cut out of 
the new foreign-aid bill that President Johnson sent to Congress.”60 He 
concluded, “a wealth of evidence has been spread on the record indicating 
that the American taxpayers, over a period of years, have been contributing to 
the support of a corrupt and shoddy Iranian regime.”61 Cook’s article dis-
mayed US officials trying to smooth over tensions with Tehran created by the 
Gudarzian case and other issues.
57Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, 8 April 1965. FRUS XXII, Document 
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The publication of “The Billion-Dollar Mystery” coincided with the 
conclusion of the McClellan inquiry just days earlier. In a follow-up article, 
Fred Cook questioned the timing of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations’ resolution of the Gudarzian case. Cook noted that 
McClellan had “hurriedly” restarted the hearings regarding the evidence 
Gudarzian had presented to support his allegations when the original 
article in The Nation had already gone to press.62 Cook acknowledged 
that Gudarzian’s claims were challenged by the Subcommittee’s conclu-
sions, but pointed to inconsistencies that remained, including Gudarzian’s 
apparent ability to obtain through his agents secret Treasury Department 
documents that had seemingly been leaked to the Iranian embassy in 
Washington.
Furthermore, Cook argued that the McClellan inquiry did not ultimately 
meet its own brief as the question of whether US aid to Iran had gone missing 
went unanswered. As far as McClellan was concerned, the money had been 
delivered to the relevant Iranian agencies; what happened thereafter was 
another matter. Reflecting on the Gudarzian case more broadly, Cook wrote 
“Was it, then, all a fraud? Or was there some validity to the Khaibar Khan’s 
charges that United States foreign aid to Iran was being diverted from its 
intended purposes?” In conclusion, Cook observed that “On the basis of the 
now-public record of these hearings, it is difficult to determine, for there is no 
direct confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination. Under such circum-
stances, certain critical questions that might have helped to resolve this ques-
tion did not get asked or answered.”63 Even so, an article in the Washington 
Post summed up the situation with its title: “Iran Aid Graft Charges Aired, 
Labeled False.”64
The Senate investigation was brought to a close approximately two years 
after Gudarzian first offered his testimony. While the subcommittee had 
other issues to contend with during that period, the timing of Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk’s meeting with Senator McClellan clearly had an impact in 
persuading the latter to resolve the case as speedily as possible. The impend-
ing publication of Cook’s article in The Nation may have also added further 
impetus to the hearings.65 Although the subcommittee had not fully 
addressed the question of whether USAID funds had been misappropriated, 
62Fred J. Cook, “Iranian Aid Story: New Twists to the Mystery,” The Nation, 24 May 1965, 550.
63Ibid., 556.
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McClellan’s public rejection of Gudarzian was considered a victory by 
American policymakers. Yet despite this significant development the Shah 
remained unimpressed as Gudarzian’s lawsuit against members of the royal 
family, Prince Mahmoud and Princess Fatemeh, was still ongoing.
The saga rumbles on
A month after the Senate investigation concluded, the Shah returned to the 
United States, briefly stopping in New York on his way from Brazil and 
Argentina to Canada and France. Noting that “We have a massage problem 
with the Shah,” Komer and Rusk urged Lyndon Johnson to have a five- 
minute telephone conversation with the Iranian leader in order to reassure 
him of the administration’s support, which they said “would be worth weeks 
of lower-level diplomacy.”66 Gudarzian was not the only problem in US– 
Iranian relations, but American officials recognized that evidence of the 
president’s interest could help to smooth the troubled waters. Johnson 
obliged and spoke to the Shah the following day, thanking him for his 
support regarding American intervention in Vietnam and the Dominican 
Republic, as well as praising him for the “phenomenal progress” Iran was 
experiencing under his leadership.67
However, in a meeting with the new American ambassador to Tehran, 
Armin Meyer, Foreign Minister Aram “spoke almost pathologically” about 
the Gudarzian case. Contrasting the Shah’s positive response to American 
policies in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam with the ongoing legal case, 
Aram “prophesied inevitable adverse effect on Iran-American friendship.” 
Meyer indicated that Aram’s anger stemmed at least in part from his feeling 
that he had been sidelined in the decision-making process when the Shah 
approved the idea of the Prince and Princess giving testimony in Iran. Aram 
in turn suggested that they might be able to testify in Washington instead of 
New York to avoid being caught up in court proceedings there.68
While it was difficult to pursue charges of forgery without the presence of 
the Iranian Prince and Princess, by June 1965 considerable progress had been 
made. Most significantly, preparations were finally underway for an indict-
ment against Gudarzian on charges of “conspiracy to commit fraud by mail.” 
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Such an indictment, however, relied on the witness testimony of a number of 
other prominent Iranians, the most important of whom, according to Rusk, 
was Abolhassan Ebtehaj. However, the former Director of Iran’s Plan 
Organization, which worked closely with the US aid program, had fallen 
from grace and been imprisoned by the Shah for seven months. As Rusk 
noted, he was “violently opposed to testifying,” thereby placing another 
obstacle in the way of a speedy resolution to the case.69
Two months later, McGeorge Bundy warned Lyndon Johnson that “We hear 
the Iranian ambassador may try to collar you tonight about a messy legal case in 
New York involving an Iranian citizen who has said slanderous things about the 
royal family and our program in Iran.” Bundy noted that while “This case has 
blown up out of all proportion. . . . The Shah resents the attacks on his family and 
can’t understand why we just don’t slap Gudarzian down.”70 The tensions 
between Washington and Tehran were further exacerbated during the summer 
of 1965 by a shift in Iranian relations with the Soviet Union. As Andrew Johns 
has argued, it is during this period that the Shah, “tired of being treated like 
a schoolboy,” sought to assert his own autonomy and independence in his 
relations with the United States.71 At the same time, the Soviet leadership 
under Leonid Brezhnev was eager to cultivate a closer relationship with Iran, 
marking a shift from the more hostile position adopted in previous decades.72 
Central to the warmer relations between Tehran and Moscow were the ongoing 
negotiations surrounding the establishment of a Soviet-funded steel mill near 
the Iranian city of Isfahan. For the Shah and many Iranians, the steel mill was 
a symbol of both Iran’s increasing independence from western interference and 
their frustration with the United States.73
Following a visit to Moscow, the Shah informed Meyer that he had “been 
spending many sleepless hours meditating re [sic] orientation Iran’s policies.” 
He added that the Soviets had proposed a two-hundred year “non-aggression 
pact” before launching into a laundry list of complaints against the United 
States, some dating back to 1944; according to Meyer, “Shah [was] particularly 
bitter about [the] Gudarzian case which in his view has dragged on an 
69Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 24 June 1965. FRUS XXII, Document 92, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d92 (accessed 12 February 2020).
70Memorandum for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 25 August 1965. Lyndon B. Johnson 
Presidential Library, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, Country File, Box 136 (1 of 2), Iran – 
Memos and Miscellaneous, 1-64-12-65.
71Andrew L. Johns, “The Johnson Administration, the Shah of Iran, and the Changing Pattern of U.S.- 
Iranian Relations, 1965–1967: Tired of Being Treated like a Schoolboy”, Journal of Cold War Studies 9, 
no. 2 (2007), 64–94.
72On Soviet-Iranian relations during the 1960s, see Michael Pye, In the Belly of the Bear? Soviet- 




unnecessary eighteen months.”74 In November, Meyer reported that the Shah 
was “convinced that Washington is determined to retaliate for his having made 
steel mill deal with Soviets,” which explained why Gudarzian had still not been 
brought to justice.75 The Shah’s insecurity when it came to American support 
for him had clearly not diminished in the two years since Lyndon Johnson had 
become president, and the Gudarzian case only served to amplify his anxieties.
Although American policymakers generally considered the Gudarzian 
affair to be a minor issue, they recognized that because the Shah considered 
it a significant issue, there were likely to be repercussions for US–Iranian 
relations. For example, Ambassador Meyer explicitly linked the Gudarzian 
case to State Department efforts to expand American intelligence facilities in 
the country due to the possibility of having similar operations expelled from 
Pakistan. Observing that the Shah’s “grievances inevitably bear a relationship 
to Iran’s receptivity to what we might wish to do here,” Meyer argued that “If 
these can be gotten out of way, climate for introduction of at least some part 
of needed facilities would be somewhat improved.” Third on Meyer’s list of 
grievances, behind American military and economic aid, was Gudarzian; 
simply put, Meyer stated, the “Shah, his family and his govt simply cannot 
understand how a crook like Gudarzian can in highly civilized US perpetrate 
gigantic hoax as Gudarzian has against Iran Prince and Princess.” Despite 
ongoing efforts to resolve the case, Meyer claimed that “it is difficult to 
convince Oriental mind like Shah’s that after 18 months something more 
could not have been done in matter so close to friendly Chief of State.”76 Two 
months later, Meyer wrote that the United States and Iran were at a “cross- 
roads” and that the “Shah needs evidence that Washington still loves him.” 
The ambassador urged his colleagues at the State Department to involve 
Lyndon Johnson in the effort to improve relations with Iran, stating that 
“Despite poison of Gudarzian fiasco, Shah trusts [the] President.” 
Acknowledging that he might be accused of “localitis,” Meyer nonetheless 
demonstrated the severity of the situation as he perceived it when he pleaded, 
“Can’t we keep this country in free world camp?”77
Writing again in November 1965, Meyer observed that Iran’s slight 
pivot toward engaging with Moscow was illustrative of the Shah’s 
increasing political and economic independence from the United 
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States. The ambassador was “convinced we no longer have ability dictate 
Shah’s policies.” Among the reasons Meyer cited for these developments 
was the ongoing Gudarzian saga; the Shah’s concerns about the experi-
ence of Pakistan during the 1965 war with India, which saw its arms 
supplies cut off by the United States; Soviet efforts to sell sophisticated 
arms to Iran; and a growing sense that his support for American goals in 
places like Vietnam was unappreciated. According to the ambassador, 
the Gudarzian case contributed to the growing distance between 
Washington and Tehran. As a result, Meyer recommended a shift in 
policy in order for the US to “be responsive to [the Shah’s] basic security 
needs.”78 The Gudarzian case, then, was one of many points of friction 
in the relationship between the United States and Iran during the 1960s, 
and it contributed to increased efforts by the Johnson administration to 
appease the Shah on contentious issues.
Conclusion
By all accounts, Gudarzian’s allegations of corruption against members of the 
Pahlavi royal family were fabricated. The checks that were central to his case, 
allegedly showing the misuse of US aid funds and bribery of prominent 
Americans with interests in Iran, were proved to be forgeries. The Senate 
inquiry heard his testimony and examined his evidence but ultimately dis-
missed his allegations. None of this is to say, of course, that members of the 
royal family were not involved in other instances of corruption. Equally, the 
misappropriation by Iranian officials of American funds intended for other 
uses may well have occurred during the Pahlavi era. On this occasion, 
however, the claims remained unproven.
Nonetheless, the case itself rumbled on for a number of years, contributing 
to a complex tapestry of interwoven tensions in US–Iranian relations. It was 
not until 1967 that, two years after the Senate inquiry dismissed Gudarzian’s 
claims, the situation was brought to a close, albeit one that proved unsatisfac-
tory to the Shah. The Department of Justice, Department of State, and US 
Embassy in Tehran all agreed that although there were grounds for pursuing 
a criminal case against Gudarzian for forgery, conviction was unlikely without 
the testimony of certain prominent Iranians. As such, it was deemed preferable 
for Gudarzian to face no prosecution rather than be acquitted in a trial.79
78Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 28 November 1965. FRUS XXII, Document 
109, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d110 (accessed 12 February 2020).
79Editorial Note. FRUS XXII, Document 188, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 
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THE HISTORIAN 41
Efforts to deport Gudarzian also appear to have proved unsuccessful, as 
his colorful life continued in the United States. In 1968, a New York court 
ruled that Gudarzian’s 1961 claim against his insurance policy for the loss of 
a vast array of clothing and jewelry, for which he had been awarded over 
$100,000 had been fraudulent. Justice J. Keating cited evidence from the 
New York fire department that the fire that had allegedly destroyed so many 
of Gudarzian’s possessions was “of suspicious origin,” noting that the 
damage occurred in two rooms separated by a “10-foot hallway in which 
there was no fire damage.”80 In 1971, he resurfaced again in newspaper 
reports when he filed for divorce from his second wife, a former 
Miss USA.81 More strangely, accounts of Robert Kennedy’s assassination 
three years earlier place Gudarzian at the scene as a volunteer on the 
senator’s presidential campaign, although only those with a conspiratorial 
flavor suggest he was in any way involved in the murder itself.82 At the time 
of the Iranian Revolution, he appeared again, offering to act as an inter-
mediary between Washington and Ayatollah Khomeini, and claiming to 
have inside knowledge about when the hostages taken by student revolu-
tionaries at the US embassy in Tehran would be released.83
However, it was during the 1960s that Gudarzian had the most significant 
impact on US–Iranian relations. His allegations of corruption within the 
Pahlavi royal family had serious repercussions for the relationship between 
Washington and Tehran. The Shah was known to be sensitive about his 
international reputation and insecure in his relationship with Washington. 
He believed that American officials were not appreciative enough of his 
friendship and he did not always believe that they were willing to mean-
ingfully address his concerns. US policymakers, meanwhile, sought to main-
tain a close relationship with the Shah, acknowledging his flaws but viewing 
him as the most viable option available to achieve their goals of security and 
stability within Iran.
Gudarzian’s allegations coincided with a period of flux in US–Iranian rela-
tions as the United States adapted to the Shah’s increasing political and eco-
nomic independence. Negotiations over military assistance and arms sales, as 
well as political issues, oil development, and Iran’s role in the Middle East 
dominated discussions between American and Iranian policymakers. Yet 
80Saks Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 23N.Y.2d 161 (1968). https://casetext.com/case/saks-co-v-continental- 
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81“Divorce Sought,” The Sydney Morning Herald Sun, 16 May 1971.
82Mel Ayton, The Forgotten Terrorist (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc, 2007), 140, 160; James DiEugenio 
and Lisa Pease, The Assassinations: Probe Magazine on JFK, MLK, RFK and Malcolm X (Port Townsend, 
WA: Feral House, 2003), 591–7, 602.
83Don Gentile, “Exiled Tribal Csees 48 Hostages Released by January 1,” New York Daily News, 22 
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Gudarzian created additional strain for diplomats of both countries, amplifying 
tensions at a time when Washington sought to ease them. The Shah viewed the 
case as a personal slight against his family and, more importantly, considered the 
Johnson administration’s inability to speedily resolve the issue as evidence that 
the United States took him for granted. At a time when the United States was 
becoming deeply embroiled in the war in Vietnam and concerned about com-
munist incursions in the oil-rich Middle East and elsewhere, Iran was seen as an 
important regional ally. It was, of course, not the only issue facing US officials, 
but the long case brought by Gudarzian made their task of strengthening 
relations with Tehran all the more difficult. In the end, Gudarzian may have 
been disappointed to discover he was only an “irritant,” but the World’s Best 
Dressed Man would no doubt have enjoyed being a “spectacular” one.
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